Increasing foreign participation and high concentration levels characterize the recent evolution of banking sectors' market structures in developing countries. We analyze the impact of these factors on Latin American bank spreads during the late 1990s. Our results suggest that foreign banks were able to charge lower spreads relative to domestic banks. This was more so for de novo foreign banks than for those that entered through acquisitions. The overall level of foreign bank participation seemed to influence spreads indirectly, primarily through its effect on administrative costs. Bank concentration was positively and directly related to both higher spreads and costs.
13.1% to 44.8% over this period. The rise in foreign bank participation has often occurred in the context of already high and in some countries rising levels of bank concentration. Among a sample of 33 developing countries, the level of bank assets held by the three largest banks averaged 64% during 1995-99. 1 The increase in foreign bank presence and the high levels of bank concentration in developing countries have been the result of a number of factors, some of them interrelated. Growing foreign bank participation has been a facet of the larger process of financial liberalization and international integration experienced by developing countries in recent years. In many cases, however, foreign entry arose from the exigencies of crises, encouraged by local banking authorities to reduce the costs of recapitalizing the domestic financial system. The high levels of concentration have also been, in part, the consequence of bank closures, mergers, and acquisitions following crises. Furthermore, foreign bank entry, in some cases, contributed to bank concentration. In many countries, foreign banks entered the system mainly by acquiring existing domestic banks. Also, it is possible that in some countries the observed domestic bank consolidation and concentration occurred in response to foreign competition.
Foreign bank entry and bank concentration may influence many aspects of banking sectors in developing countries.
2 A question of interest for policymakers and academics alike is the impact of these factors on bank spreads-the difference between the rate charged to borrowers and the rate paid by depositors. Spreads are commonly interpreted as a measure of the cost of financial intermediation (see Schumacher, 2000, Brock and Rojas Suarez, 2000) . High spreads can hinder the growth of savings and investment and imply that the cost of using the financial system may become prohibitive for certain borrowers. Furthermore, the impact of high spreads is likely to be more severe for developing countries where, given that capital markets are generally small and under-developed, a larger percentage of firms and individuals tend to depend on banks to meet their financial needs.
A number of recent papers have investigated the impact of foreign entry on bank spreads and other variables (see for example Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga, 2000 , Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar, 2000 , Denizer, 2000 . Yet, only some of these studies have also taken into account the parallel trend toward more consolidation in the sector. None has examined how different types of foreign bank entry affect spreads.
At the same time, many papers have focused on the impact of concentration on the degree of competition in the banking sector and, hence, on overall bank profitability. 3 However, typically, these studies have not examined the direct impact on bank 1. Figures obtained from Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) . 2. For a review of the potential consequences of foreign bank participation, see Levine (1996) . For a discussion of the impact of bank concentration on profitability, see Berger (1995) . For a test of whether bank consolidation and concentration has worsened competition in developing countries, see Gelos and Roldós (2002) .
3. See Gelos and Roldós (2002) for developing countries and Berger (1995) for a review of the U.S. evidence.
spreads. Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) is an exception. This paper analyzes the effect of concentration and bank regulation on spreads, but in this study little attention is paid to the simultaneous impact that foreign bank participation could have on spreads.
Our paper investigates the impact of foreign bank participation and concentration on bank spreads in a sample of developing Latin American countries during the late 1990s. Using bank-level data for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, we examine a number of hypotheses. First, we investigate whether foreign banks are able to operate with lower spreads, directly benefiting borrowers. We refer to this effect as the "own effect" of foreign bank presence.
Second, we examine whether the type of foreign bank entry influences how big the "own effect" might be. In other words, among the foreign banks we distinguish between those that entered or increased their presence in the system by acquiring domestic banks and those that established de novo operations. Dell' Aricia and Marquez (2004) suggest that even if all banks are equally cost efficient, they might change spreads based on their specialization in different market segments. An alternative explanation for variations in spreads across foreign banks might be related to differences in the pricing strategies pursued to gain market share, even if they lend to the same segments. Though we are not able to formally test whether variations in market segments or in pricing strategies account for differences in spreads across banks, to our knowledge, our study is the first to examine whether all forms of foreign entry have the same impact on spreads.
Third, we analyze whether there is a "spillover effect" as a result of foreign bank participation. That is, once we control for the origin (domestic or foreign) of individual banks, we test whether the overall level of foreign bank participation in the banking system raises or lowers spreads across the board, and in particular among domestic banks. A priori, the spillover effect of foreign bank participation is indeterminate. Spreads would be lowered if foreign banks compete directly with domestic banks forcing them to lower their spreads. 4 Alternatively, faced with foreign bank competition, domestic banks may redirect their lending to segments that are more opaque and where they have an informational advantage and greater market power, allowing them to charge higher spreads (Dell'Arricia and Marquez 2004) .
Finally, we study the impact of bank concentration on bank spreads by including several measures of system-wide bank concentration in our estimations. At the same time, we control for banks' market share and for cases of bank consolidation.
We believe this paper contributes to the existing literature not only by testing some hypotheses that have been overlooked before, but also by focusing on a region that has been at the forefront of the recent changes in bank market structure in developing countries and that has been traditionally characterized by having high spreads. Thus, we feel that Latin America makes for an interesting case study for 4. Domestic banks may lower spreads either because they are driven to become more efficient following bank entry (by imitating some of the practices introduced by foreign banks) or because they are forced to give up some of the margins they were able to charge before. In other words, lower spreads could be the result of lower costs or lower revenues. a number of reasons. First, despite having embarked in a process of financial market liberalization during the late 1980s and early 1990s, which included the elimination of interest rates and direct credit controls, spreads in the region remained high by the mid-1990s.
5 Second, perhaps after Eastern Europe, Latin America has been the region to witness the sharpest increase in foreign bank participation (IMF 2000) . Third, concentration rose or remains high (depending on the country) in part because many foreign banks increased their participation by acquiring domestic banks. Also, in many of these countries, there has been a trend toward consolidation among domestic banks.
Our empirical analysis yields a number of interesting results. We find that foreign banks are able to charge lower spreads and have lower costs than domestic banks. Moreover, those foreign banks that acquired domestic institutions have higher spreads than those that established de novo operations, suggesting either some market segmentation or differences in pricing strategies to gain market share. However, we do not find consistent evidence of a direct spillover effect on spreads. Instead, the degree of system-wide foreign bank participation (as measured by the share of total loans) appears to influence spreads through its effects on costs. Greater participation of foreign banks lowers costs all around. On the other hand, the degree of concentration in the banking system has a positive and economically significant impact on both spreads and costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the structure of the banking sector and the behavior of bank spreads in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru over the late 1990s. Section 2 discusses the empirical methodology and data used to study the determinants of bank spreads in Latin America. Section 3 presents the empirical results and Section 4 concludes.
FOREIGN BANK PARTICIPATION, CONCENTRATION, AND SPREADS IN LATIN AMERICA
As in many developing economies, countries in Latin America experienced a significant increase in foreign bank participation during the late 1990s (see Table 1 ). In Argentina, foreign bank participation increased from 18.9% in 1995 to 49.4% of outstanding loans in 2000. In Chile, Mexico, and Peru, the share of bank loans held by foreign banks rose from below 15% in 1995 to exceed 40% by the end of the decade. Colombia is the only country in our sample where foreign banks consistently accounted for one-fourth of the loans during the period under consideration.
Despite the dramatic increase in foreign bank participation, the total number of banks in the region dropped in four of the five countries and concentration levels 5. Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000) study spreads in Latin America during 1990-96 and conclude that they have not gone down significantly (perhaps with the exception of Mexico) and in many cases are still three times higher than those observed for industrial countries (though less so for Chile). In general, the study finds that high operating or administrative costs are particularly significant in explaining the behavior of bank spreads in the region.
6. In the case of Mexico, the foreign bank share exceeded 40% by 2001. The drop in the number of banks and the high or rising concentration levels can be ascribed to several reasons. First, there were many bank closures during this period. Such closures typically followed periods of financial distress in the countries, like the Tequila crisis in Argentina in 1995, when 32 banks closed, and the 1998-99 period of financial turmoil in Colombia, when four institutions were liquidated.
Second, much of the increase in foreign bank participation resulted from purchases of domestic banks. Thus, foreign entry did not typically add to the number of banks. In Argentina, these were 16 cases where foreign banks acquired domestic financial institutions during the period 1995-2000. The Spanish banks BBVA and Santander, the British bank HSBC, and the Canadian Scotia Bank were among the most significant entrants in Argentina. During the same period, foreign banks acquired five domestic banks in Chile, two in Colombia, and three in Mexico. As in Argentina, Santander, BBVA, and Scotia were important players in these countries. Though there were also some truly de novo entries, i.e., cases of foreign banks that started their own operations without any affiliation with domestic banks, these were not the norm.
7 Six foreign banks set up de novo operations in Argentina, while two banks settled in Peru over this period. This explains why the total number of foreign banks in these countries did not increase at the same pace as the increase in foreign bank participation in the system.
At the same time, many domestic banks also consolidated with other domestic banks due to financial distress or as a strategy to compete with foreign banks, bringing down the total number of institutions. Thirty-seven such transactions took place in Argentina, four in Chile, three in Colombia, and three in Peru during the late 1990s.
What has been the impact of foreign bank participation and concentration on bank spreads? While a detailed econometric analysis is required to answer this question, it is interesting to note some trends in these variables. In Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, spreads have dropped during most of the late 1990s (see Table  1 ). A cursory look at the data for these countries suggests that spreads tended to decline in periods when foreign participation increased, but concentration levels remained constant. In Chile and Mexico, the increase in foreign participation appears to have had little effect on spreads perhaps because both countries had high levels of concentration at the start of the period and throughout. Note, however, that by the mid-1990s, spreads in Chile and Mexico were already quite low by regional standards.
Foreign and domestic bank spreads appear to move very much in tandem across countries in the region. This behavior could signal the influence of macroeconomic factors and/or similar cost structures that affect all banks in the system, as well as the possibility that in general or at least in certain markets, foreign and domestic banks compete with each other for customers. However, in Argentina, Colombia, and Peru, throughout most of the sample, and in all countries by the end of the period, foreign banks seemed to be able to operate with lower spreads.
7. Following the lifting of restrictions on foreign entry, 15 foreign banks initiated operations in Mexico during 1995 and 1996. These entrants were small relative to the existing domestic banks, and the main increase in foreign bank participation occurred through the acquisition of domestic banks after 1998.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND DATA
In this section, we turn to an econometric analysis of the impact of concentration and foreign bank presence on bank spreads. In particular, we study the effect of market structure changes on bank spreads, while controlling for a host of bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables, by estimating regressions of the following form:
where i is the bank id, j identifies the country, and t refers to the time period considered. Equation (1) is motivated by the dealership model of bank spreads developed by Ho and Saunders (1981) , extended by Allen (1988) , Angbazo (1997) , and others, and the firm-theoretical framework developed by Zarruck (1989) and Wong (1997) . 8 Both models predict that operating costs, regulatory costs, credit risks, and the market structure of the banking sector can affect spreads.
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In Equation (1), the variable Spread is the difference between the implicit average interest charged on loans and the implicit average interest paid on deposits. In other words, the spread is calculated by taking the total interest received by banks on loans during one quarter divided by the average loans for that period and subtracting from it the total interest paid on deposits throughout the quarter divided by average deposits. Liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid to total assets. Liquid assets 8. According to the dealership approach, banks are risk-averse dealers trying to balance loan and deposit markets, where loan requests and deposit flows are not necessarily synchronized. In this setup, bank spreads are interpreted as fees charged by banks for the provision of liquidity under transactions uncertainty. The firm-theoretical model of banks assumes that these operate in a static framework where the demand and supply for loans and deposits clears both markets.
9. A common limitation of the empirical applications of these frameworks is that market structure differences across countries have been modeled by including country dummies (see Saunders and Schumacher 2000) , that is, they have been implicitly assumed to be constant over time.
refer to cash and deposit balances in other banks (including reserve requirements at the central bank). High liquidity ratios, either self-imposed for prudential reasons or as a result of regulation (e.g., reserve or liquidity requirements), inflict a cost on banks since they have to give up holding higher-yielding assets. To the extent that banks are able to transfer this opportunity cost to borrowers, spreads will rise with liquidity ratios.
Administrative Costs refer to the ratio of administrative expenses (including payroll and overhead) to average assets. If banks incur high administrative costs in the process of providing their services as intermediaries, they are likely to increase the spread they charge their customers. NPLs is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. This variable is intended to capture credit risk. Faced with higher credit risk, banks are likely to charge higher rates on their loans, as equity holders demand risk-adjusted returns. Equity refers to the share of bank equity to total assets. Holding large equity ratios either on a voluntary basis or as a result of regulation can be costly for banks. We would expect bank spreads to rise with this variable. Bank Market Share is the ratio of each bank's loans to total system loans. To the extent that market shares get translated into market power, banks with higher shares of the market may be able to charge higher rates on loans. On the other hand, larger banks may be able to reap economies of scale and may pass on some of these benefits to their customers in the form of lower spreads.
Foreign Bank is a dummy that takes the value 1 if a bank is foreign at each point in time. By introducing this variable, we can test whether the average spread for foreign banks is significantly different from the average spread for domestic institutions. That is, this variable allows us to test for the own effect of foreign bank presence. Foreign M&A is a dummy variable that identifies those transactions where foreign banks increased their size or began operations within our sample by acquiring domestic banks. Foreign De Novo, on the other hand, is a zero/one variable that captures those foreign banks that set up de novo operations in a given country. The purpose of including the latter two variables is to determine how the spreads for these banks compare with those that have been foreign since the start of the sample and how different modes of foreign bank entry and/or strategies to increase participation in local markets affect bank spreads.
We also control for other types of mergers and acquisitions, namely those involving domestic banks or foreign banks, by including the variable Other M&As, which takes the value 1 for those domestic or foreign banks that acquired an institution of the same type. Both M&A variables (i.e., Foreign and Other) plus the dummy identifying foreign de novo entry are interacted with Age, the time since entry (measured in years), to allow for the possibility that there is an adjustment period until banks can attain their desired level of spreads after they enter a new market or purchase/merge with a bank.
Foreign Bank Participation is the share of loans in the hand of foreign banks. This variable captures the dynamic impact of changes in the relative importance of foreign banks on the overall level of spreads. In other words, this variable is included to test whether there is a spillover effect arising from the presence of foreign banks in the system. Banking Sector Concentration measures the extent to which loans are concentrated on the hands of few banks within a system. In most of the estimations, we include three different measures of concentration, namely, the Herfindahl indexdefined as the sum of squared loan market shares-plus the share of loans held by the top three and top five largest banks, respectively. We expect concentration measures to have a positive impact on bank spreads, once we control for differences in cost ratios across banks. Furthermore, contrary to the literature on bank concentration and profitability, where a positive association between these variables can signal different things, we interpret a positive sign on bank concentration as an indication of greater market power and less competition in the banking sector.
10
Given that the level of bank spreads can be affected by the macroeconomic environment in which banks operate, we control for the Inflation rate, the Real Output Growth, and a measure of the money market Short-Term Real Interest Rate. Following Smith (2001), we include the inflation rate for two reasons. First, given that bank spreads are the difference between two nominal rates, if inflation shocks are not passed through to both rates equally fast, then spreads should reflect this. Second, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) have found that inflation can affect the flexibility of loan rates and therefore of bank spreads. The real growth of output variable could help pick up business cycle effects as those discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) . These studies suggest that changes in output can affect lending rates, and consequently spreads, because borrowers' creditworthiness is countercyclical. As output growth slows down, creditworthiness deteriorates and, other things equal, this is likely to be reflected in higher bank loan rates and, consequently, spreads. Finally, we include a measure of the shortterm money market real interest rate to control for the marginal cost of funds faced by banks.
We obtained bank-level balance sheet and income statement data from the Superintendency of Banks in each of the countries in our sample. For Argentina, Chile, and Peru, the data cover the period 1995-2000. For Colombia, we obtained data for 1997-2000. For Mexico, where a change in accounting standards does not allow us to use data before 1997, the sample studied is 1998-2001. The data frequency is quarterly in all cases. The corresponding bank authorities also provided detailed accounts on the foreign banks operating in each country at each point in time along
10. An extensive literature exists studying the impact of concentration on bank profitability (see Berger 1995 for a review). While the literature unanimously predicts a positive association between concentration and profitability, different theories exist explaining what is behind this result. The structure-conductperformance theory argues that bank concentration signals market power and that a positive association between profits and concentration is unambiguously bad for the economy. A related theory is the relative market power hypothesis, which claims that only firms with large market share and differentiated products can obtain market power and are able to earn profits above normal. On the other hand, the efficiencystructure hypothesis contends that larger concentration levels and market shares could reflect greater efficiency by the largest banks, which in turn are able to lower costs and obtain higher profits. While a problem of observational equivalence exists in interpreting the relation between bank concentration and profits, this issue should not arise in analyzing bank spreads. Relatively more efficient banks should be able to charge lower spreads, as a result of having lower costs. Consequently, a positive association between bank spreads and concentration should signal greater market power and less competition in the banking sector.
with information on their mode of entry (e.g., via acquisitions or by de novo entry). They also supplied us with the list of mergers and acquisitions among domestic banks and between existing foreign banks.
Data on inflation, output growth, and the real short-term interest rate came from the IMF International Financial Statistics database. Table 2 contains a detailed description of the variables used in this paper together with means and standard deviations for each of them. 11 3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS Table 3 presents the estimation results for Equation (1), analyzing the determinants of loan-deposit spreads for private banks in Latin America. 12 In particular, results are reported for all private banks and, separately, for domestic and foreign banks, respectively. Throughout, the t-statistics shown were calculated allowing standard errors to be correlated for observations corresponding to the same bank within a country (i.e., using clustered standard errors as described by Rogers, 1993) .
The estimates reported in Table 3 were obtained by pooling all countries in our sample (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). However, they are not intended to explain variations across countries. Instead, because they include country fixed-effects, they explain changes in spreads over time within a country. The purpose of pooling observations in this context is to increase the power of our estimations.
13
At the same time, pooling assumes that the relation between bank spreads and its determinants can be characterized by the same coefficients for all countries. Thus, as part of our sensitivity analysis, we report and discuss below results in which we do not include all countries in the estimation.
The determinants of spreads may be categorized into three groups. First, bankspecific variables that include operational characteristics (such as Liquidity, Non-Performing Loans, and Administrative Costs), the bank's market share, whether it is foreign or domestic, whether the formation of the bank was the result of a merger or acquisition (M&A), or whether the bank was a new (de novo) entrant, and the interaction of bank's age with the foreign and M&A dummies.
14 Second, system-wide measures of market structure, including the degree of foreign bank participation and 11. Note that while Table 1 reports annualized spreads, Table 2 presents quarterly spreads, since the regressions are conducted with quarterly observations. 12. Because the spreads charged by public banks may be subject to constraints due to direct subsidies and other political considerations, we do not include these banks in our sample. Also, since implicit bank spreads calculated from quarterly income and balance sheet data can be quite volatile, we exclude those observations in the top and bottom 5 percentile of the distribution of the change in bank spreads. The purpose of doing so is to avoid the possibility that outliers drive our results. However, eliminating these observations does not change the results described below.
13. For example, we are interested in analyzing if and how the mode of foreign bank entry, by merger and acquisition or by de novo entry, affects bank spreads. However, there are few such transactions in each country to study this question on a country-by-country basis.
14. To address the concern of possible reverse causality from spreads to bank's operational characteristics (such as liquid assets, non-performing loans, and market share), we also estimated similar regressions using one-quarter lags of these variables as regressors with virtually identical findings. To save space, these results are available upon request. concentration. 15 And, finally, variables that control for the macroeconomic environment-inflation, real growth of production, and the real market interest rate.
For the sample including all banks, among the bank-specific variables, bank liquidity and administrative costs have a positive and significant impact on bank spreads in all three specifications, corresponding to the different measures of concentration. Banks that either decide or are required by regulation to hold a high proportion of their assets in the form of liquid assets seem to charge higher spreads. This can be interpreted as banks' response to the fact that in holding higher liquidity ratios, banks forego a return on such assets. However, the impact of higher liquidity on bank spreads seems to be quantitatively small: a one standard deviation increase in liquidity raises spreads by 0.14 standard deviation. On the other hand, administrative costs have a larger impact on bank spreads: a one standard deviation change in administrative costs results in an almost 0.6 standard deviation change in spreads. As discussed below, administrative costs are influenced by macro country characteristics (inflation, growth, and domestic interest rates) and subsume their effects in these regressions, as a consequence of which the macro variables do not appear to have a direct influence on spreads.
Foreign banks, on average, charge lower spreads (0.5% lower per quarter) than their domestic counterparts. For foreign banks that enter through an M&A process, the full effect on spreads is the sum of the Foreign Bank dummy (which has a negative sign) and the Foreign M&A dummy (which has a positive sign). This sum is negative and statistically different from zero, as noted in the F-test reported at the bottom of Table 3 . The estimated coefficients indicate that spreads for foreign banks that 15. Because bank origin might be correlated with the degree of foreign bank participation (i.e., the larger the number of foreign banks, the more likely it is that foreign bank participation will be high) and bank market share might be positively associated with the level of system-wide concentration, we reestimated the equations after excluding these bank-level variables to confirm the robustness of our findings. Our main findings remain unchanged. These results are available upon request. Notes: Estimations include Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Robust tϪstatistics (calculated allowing for clustered standard errors by bank) are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
entered the system through acquisitions of domestic banks are 0.26% per quarter lower than those for domestic banks. Since the Foreign De Novo dummy is also negative, its sum with the Foreign Bank dummy is a large negative, implying that while both types of foreign banks charge lower spreads than domestic banks, the de novo foreign banks charge much lower spreads (around 2.7% per quarter lower than those for domestic banks). The interactions between the mode of entry by foreign banks and the time since entry (Age) are never significant.
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Two factors could explain why the spreads charged by foreign banks that entered the market by acquiring domestic banks might differ from those of de novo entrants. First, de novo banks, interested in gaining market share, may be more willing to charge lower rates to reach their desired size. Second, the two types of foreign banks may be targeting different market segments. Dell' Aricia and Marquez (2004) suggest that differences in the information available to banks influence who they lend to and the spreads they are able to charge. By virtue of being newcomers to the sector, de novo banks are likely to possess the least information about domestic borrowers and, hence, would have an incentive to focus on the more transparent segments of the market (i.e., where information about borrowers is most accessible). At the same time, since transparent market segments are likely to be more competitive, de novo banks would be required to charge lower spreads relative to those possible in other market segments. In contrast, foreign banks acquiring or merging with domestic banks would inherit proprietary customer information, allowing them to serve somewhat less transparent firms, in less contestable markets, where they might have some market power and the ability to charge higher spreads. Since both types of foreign banks charge lower spreads than their domestic competitors, it is possible that domestic banks are forced to increase their lending to the least transparent borrowers from whom they are able to obtain the highest spreads.
17
Beyond their incentive and ability to charge lower spreads, do foreign banks have a spillover effect on the overall level of spreads? We test this possibility by investigating if the foreign bank participation variable (i.e., the share of loans held by banks that are at least 50% foreign owned) influences spreads. In our basic estimations in Table 3 , this variable is statistically insignificant. This result could imply either that no spillover effect exists (lower spreads charged by foreign banks do not create sufficient pressure on other banks to lower their spreads, perhaps, because of market segmentation) or that the spillover effect operates mainly in an indirect manner; for example, through the impact of foreign competition on administrative costs, as we examine below. It is possible, of course, that because foreign bank participation is rising over time, the variable picks up mainly a time trend and does not speak to the issue of "spillovers." We also explore this possibility below.
16. Excluding these interaction terms does not change our results. 17. Testing these speculations would require specific data on the portfolio of the different banks, which are not available at the present time in the detail that is necessary. As a second best alternative, we tried controlling for the share of loans to assets and the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets to take into account that some de novo banks might be investing in bonds and/or securities rather than lending. However, these variables never proved to be significant and in some cases reduced our sample size. Thus, these results are not reported here, but are available upon request.
Finally, for the sample including all banks, higher bank concentration raises spreads significantly. Regardless of the measure of concentration included, spreads rise as a response to increases in bank concentration. A one standard deviation increase in concentration results in a 0.13-0.25 standard deviation change in bank spreads.
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In the rest of Table 3 , we present estimations for the determinants of spreads among domestic banks only (columns 4-6) and foreign banks only (columns 7-9). We continue to find that liquidity and administrative costs have a positive impact on bank spreads, with administrative costs exercising the stronger influence, especially among foreign banks. Within the sample of domestic banks, we also find that those with higher market shares are able to charge lower spreads. This may point to the presence of economies of scale among large domestic banks. Within the group of foreign banks, the evidence for lower spreads charged by the new entrants is reaffirmed. Once again, changes in foreign bank participation do not seem to directly affect the overall level of spreads for domestic or foreign banks. Finally, as before, a rise in bank concentration leads to higher spreads, with the effect being particularly high and significant for domestic banks.
The spread estimations reported in Table 3 make three assumptions. First, by pooling observations across countries, we are forcing the coefficients in the spread equations (except for the constant) to be the same for all countries. Second, we are also assuming that there are no structural shifts (over time) in the relation between bank spreads and their determinants. Finally, we are ignoring possible common shocks or time trends.
Because of the short time series at our disposal, we are unable to run separate regressions for each country and formally test the pooling assumption.
19 However, we conduct alternative estimations to analyze the sensitivity of our results to this assumption. In particular, we obtain results excluding Mexico and Colombia, the countries with the shortest time series and the lowest levels of foreign bank participation (see Table 4 ). 20 Reassuringly, the results are virtually the same for this smaller sample. Also, to mitigate the concern that our findings are driven by Argentina, the country with the longest time series, Table 4 also reports estimations excluding this country. Again, results remained largely unchanged.
To test for structural shifts in the relation between spreads and their determinants over time, we try two possibilities (see Table 5 ). First, we interact administrative costs (the most consistently significant variable across all spread specifications) with a dummy that equals one for the period 1999 and beyond. Second, to assess whether 18. In particular, a one standard deviation change in the share of loans held by the top three banks (top five banks) results in a 0.25 (0.13) standard deviation change in bank spreads. At the same time, a one standard deviation change in the Herfindahl index leads to a 0.20 standard deviation rise in bank spreads.
19. Argentina is the exception, given its large number of banks. Results for Argentina yield the same results and conclusions as those for the panel. These results are available upon request.
20. To save space, in Tables 4 and 5 , we only report estimations including the loan share of the three largest banks as a measure of concentration. However, regressions using the top five bank share and the Herfindahl index produce virtually the same results. These are available upon request. the impact of administrative costs on bank spreads changed with the increase in foreign bank presence, we interact administrative costs with the foreign bank share. All interaction terms are always insignificant and our main results do not change. To control for possible time trends, we repeat our spread estimations including quarterly time dummies (see Table 6 ). Most of our results remain unchanged, except that among domestic banks, the foreign bank share has a positive impact on spreads. One possible explanation for this result is that competition from foreign banks causes domestic banks to redirect their lending to more opaque borrowers to whom they can charge higher spreads. However, this finding does not imply that the net effect of foreign bank participation on domestic banks is to increase their spreads, since as discussed above, the presence of foreign banks can affect spreads indirectly through its impact on administrative costs. We turn to this issue next. Table 7 presents the determinants of administrative costs (expressed as a ratio of total assets) for all banks and separately for domestic and foreign banks. 21 The macro variables are now seen to be significant among domestic banks, unlike in the spreads equations. Inflation is negatively signed, suggesting that bank costs do not respond immediately to general inflation. Higher interest rates, which are a proxy for the marginal cost of capital, raise administrative costs.
In general, foreign banks appear to operate with lower costs relative to domestic banks. However, in the estimations including all banks, different types of foreign bank entry (via M&As or through de novo entry) do not seem to have differential effects on costs. On the other hand, in the specification for foreign banks, we find that those that entered through merger and acquisitions with domestic banks have higher costs than other foreign banks.
Regardless of their origin, the overall level of foreign bank presence seems to exert a downward pressure on the administrative costs of all banks. Thus, despite evidence consistent with the hypothesis of market segmentation in our spreads results, foreign bank presence apparently generates sufficient competitive pressure to induce an all-round lowering of costs.
However, if foreign bank entry is also associated with increased concentration, there may be an offsetting effect. Our results indicate that costs, indeed, go up with concentration. Note that unlike for spreads, where the influence of concentration was especially large for domestic banks, more concentration seems to raise costs all around in similar measure. This result is consistent with the notion that in more concentrated systems there is less pressure for banks to lower their administrative costs in order to offer more competitive spreads. Since bank concentration was also seen to raise spreads, it has a particularly powerful effect on the costs of intermediation.
As with the spreads estimations, we repeated the regressions dropping Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia and adding time dummies. The results remain the same. To save space, we do not report these results here, but they are available upon request. Notes: These estimations include observations for Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. Robust t-statistics (calculated allowing for clustered standard errors by bank) in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the impact of foreign participation and concentration on bank spreads. Our results show that these factors influence the spreads charged to borrowers, and hence the process of financial intermediation, in a complex manner. The overall effect depends on three different channels of influence: the spreads charged by foreign banks relative to domestic banks, the spillover effects from the presence of foreign banks on both spreads charged and on operating costs, and the concentration in the banking sector that has accompanied foreign entry. Consider each in turn.
First, foreign banks charge lower interest margins and potentially foster financial intermediation. New establishments (i.e., de novo banks) operate with particularly low spreads. However, whether such entry generates welfare gains is unclear. This will depend on whether the lower spreads charged are the consequence of a more aggressive pricing strategy or because de novo banks choose to lend only to the most transparent segments with high market contestability.
Second, greater foreign presence does not imply a general decline in spreads, but appears to influence the intermediation through lowering costs of operation. More widespread foreign bank presence is associated with cost reduction throughout the banking system. Possibly, a combination of demonstration effects and potential competition, with banks threatening to encroach on each others' customer base, generates the pressures for cost reduction that ultimately benefit bank clients. Thus, the long-term benefits of foreign entry are likely to come from lower cost structures in the banking system. Third, greater concentration raises spreads in an economically important manner. This is so especially for domestic banks. At the same time, concentration is also associated with higher administrative costs all around. The implication is that part of the benefits from foreign entry may be offset where concentration levels also increase. As noted in the introduction, the consolidation that did occur in the banking sectors of the countries concerned was not necessarily related to foreign entry, although the fact that much of the entry was in the form of takeovers, rather than new establishments, did not help create more competition. For policymakers, this creates a challenge since more competition is desirable for lowering spreads, but could generate vulnerability where the "franchise" value of domestic banks is seriously eroded.
Finally, while we believe this paper adds to our understanding of the impact of foreign participation and concentration on the costs of financial intermediation in developing countries, more work in this area is clearly needed. Given the limited number of countries and short sample period we study, there is a need to extend the analysis in both these directions. Also, further research linking bank-level data with the banks' customer profiles would help to explain the apparent differences in the spreads charged by foreign and domestic banks, something that this paper speculates on but cannot answer definitively.
